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Adapting to changing task demands is one of the hallmarks of human cognition. According
to an influential theory, the conflict monitoring theory, the adaptation of information
processing occurs in a context-sensitive manner in that conflicts signal the need for control
recruitment. Starting from the conflict monitoring theory, here the authors discuss the role
of affect in the context of conflict-triggered processing adjustments from three different
perspectives: (1) the affective value of conflict per se, (2) the affective modulation of
conflict-triggered processing adjustments, and (3) the modulation of conflict adaptation
by reward. Based on the current empirical evidence, the authors stress the importance of
disentangling effects of affect and reward on conflict-triggered control adjustments.
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Cognitive control refers to the human ability to intentionally
carry out a weak response in the face of a dominant but inap-
propriate response (e.g., Miller and Cohen, 2001). Within the last
decade, there have been tremendous research activities within the
neuroscientific and psychological disciplines, to learn more about
the specific mechanisms underlying such cognitive flexibility. The
first main challenge was to identify and understand the processes
that inform the cognitive system when and how to implement
control without relying on an omniscient homunculus (e.g.,
Monsell, 1996). In this context, Botvinick et al. (1999, 2001, 2004)
in their influential conflict monitoring theory suggested a conflict
monitoring module that automatically detects response conflicts
in the ongoing processing stream by monitoring the amount
of energy over conflicting response nodes.1 The elegancy of the
assumption is that such a conflict detector does not have to know
the correct response; it simply registers the need for additional
control as a consequence of the simultaneous activation of con-
flicting response tendencies. This conflict information is then sent
forward to a control module that biases processing selectivity in
accordance with the current task demands. Thus, the detection
of a response conflict in trialN triggers the increase of control
in trialN+1. Behaviorally, this assumption receives support from
findings of sequential conflict adjustments in response interfer-
ence tasks (see Egner, 2007), with the particular finding of smaller
1In this review we will focus on conflict-triggered control adjustments, but
acknowledge that other signals, e.g., errors (Holroyd and Coles, 2002), may
also induce processing adaptations.
response interference effects in trials following conflict than in
trials without prior response conflict (e.g., Gratton et al., 1992;
Stürmer et al., 2002; Kerns et al., 2004). On a neuronal level,
this conflict-control loop is implemented in the anterior cingu-
late cortex (ACC), that has repeatedly been shown to get activated
by response conflicts (Botvinick et al., 1999; Cohen et al., 2000;
MacDonald et al., 2000), and the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex
(DLPFC) that presumably increases attention to task relevant
information, thereby reducing the influence of task irrelevant
information (e.g., Kerns et al., 2004; Kerns, 2006).
THE ROLE OF AFFECT, REWARD, AND AROUSAL IN
SEQUENTIAL CONTROL ADJUSTMENTS
Recently, Botvinick (2007)—in an attempt to integrate findings
showing that the ACC is not only activated by response conflicts
but also bymonetary loss, social exclusion, pain, and negative per-
formance feedback (e.g., Rainville, 2002; Eisenberger et al., 2003;
Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004; Singer et al., 2004)—suggested that the
ACC might monitor for any aversive event in general. Aversive
signals, from this perspective might then either serve as avoid-
ance learning signal for future action selection (e.g., Holroyd and
Coles, 2002; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2004) or as a trigger for process-
ing adjustments (e.g., Kerns et al., 2004; Akcay and Hazeltine,
2007). The idea that the ACC monitors affective and cognitive
conflict is not new and has been ascribed to segregate parts of the
ACC, namely the ventral ACC for affective conflict and the dorsal
ACC for cognitive conflict (Bush et al., 2000). Interestingly, in a
recent review, Shackman et al. argued against this segregate model
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and gathered strong evidence that the anterior midcingulate cor-
tex (aMCC) is conjointly activated by negative affect, pain, and
cognitive control (Shackman et al., 2011b). This fits perfectly with
the idea that this region of the ACC serves the function of an aver-
sive signal detector in general, as suggested by Botvinick (2007).
Importantly, the claim of the ACC as an aversive signal detector
has several implications: first, if the ACC registers aversive events,
then conflicts per se should produce an aversive and thus, most
likely affective signal, too. Second, aversive signals should trigger
processing adjustments even in the absence of response conflicts if
avoidance is not an option, whereas positive signals, on the other
hand, should reduce processing adjustments.
So far, there exists evidence for both kinds of modulations.
Accordingly, we will start our overview by reviewing the exist-
ing literature dealing with the affective value of conflict per se.
Subsequently, we will present and aim to dissociate affective mod-
ulations from reward-based modulations of conflict-triggered
processing adjustments, as previous affect and reward studies
revealed inconsistent findings (see Table 1 for an overview).
THE AFFECTIVE VALUE OF CONFLICTS
In two recent studies we could provide evidence in favor of the
aversive nature of conflicts. In Dreisbach and Fischer (2012), we
adopted the affective priming paradigm (Fazio et al., 1986; Fazio,
2001), in which positive and negative primes ease the affective
evaluation of positive and negative targets accordingly. Here, con-
gruent and incongruent Stroop color words served as primes (e.g.,
RED written in red or in green) and distinct positive and negative
words and pictures (e.g., love vs. hate) as targets. Participants’ task
was to evaluate the affective valence of the targets. In two experi-
ments we found a significant interaction of prime congruency and
target valence, showing that—as predicted—positive targets were
evaluated faster after congruent Stroop primes whereas negative
targets were evaluated faster after incongruent Stroop primes.
The results were taken as first empirical evidence for the aversive
nature of conflicts. Comparable results have also been reported
for action compatible common household objects (Brouillet et al.,
2011). In a further study (Fritz and Dreisbach, in press) the
authors investigated whether the aforementioned conflict prim-
ing effect was actually due to the affective valence inherent in
conflict primes or simply due to a match of processing fluency
between prime and target (since positive stimuli as well as con-
gruent primes can be processed faster than negative stimuli and
incongruent primes). To this end, only neutral targets were pre-
sented (words and Chinese characters) and participants’ task was
to judge spontaneously the affective valence of the (neutral) tar-
gets. Results of two experiments showed that neutral targets were
more often judged as positive after congruent and more often as
negative after incongruent Stroop primes. Results were thus per-
fectly in line with the first study (Dreisbach and Fischer, 2012)
and show that conflict stimuli do not simply share basic pro-
cessing characteristics with affective stimuli but do indeed convey
affective valence.
More indirect evidence for the aversive nature of conflict
comes from studies showing that conflict stimuli promote avoid-
ance behavior (Kool et al., 2010; Schouppe et al., 2012). For
example, in the Schouppe et al. study, participants were asked
to move a manikin on the screen either toward or away from a
Stroop color word (depending on its color). The Stroop color
words could either be congruent (e.g., BLUE printed in blue),
stimulus incongruent (BLUE printed in yellow with blue and
yellow affording the same manual response) or response incon-
gruent (BLUE printed in brown, with blue and brown affording
different manual responses). The authors found a significant
reduction of the stimulus interference effect in the avoidance con-
dition as compared to the approach condition, leading them to
the general conclusion that stimulus conflict stimulates avoidance
behavior. Interestingly, however, this effect was not found for the
response interference condition, which raises the question of how
important response execution actually is in order to elicit aversive
reactions.
To the best of our knowledge, so far there is only one study that
failed to find evidence for the aversive nature of conflict. Schacht
et al. (2010) used a Simon conflict task and registered peripheral
reactions such as skin conductance response, pupil diameter, and
corrugator activation, all of which are known to be sensitive to
arousal or affect manipulations. Even though the typical Simon
conflict was found in the behavioral data as well as in the N2
component of the EEG, a conflict signal frequently observed in
response conflict tasks (Yeung et al., 2004), the peripheral mea-
sures were not differentially affected by conflict and non-conflict
stimuli.
Taken together, most evidence so far speaks in favor of the
aversive nature of conflicts. Furthermore, from the fact that in
both conflict priming studies, the primes did not afford an overt
response (Dreisbach and Fischer, 2012; Fritz and Dreisbach, in
press), together with the observation that only stimulus incongru-
ence (but not response incongruence) enhanced avoidance behav-
ior (Schouppe et al., 2012), it seems that response execution is not
that critical a process for conflict to occur as originally assumed
in the conflict monitoring model where conflict is computed over
the response layer (see Botvinick et al., 2001). However, Botvinick
et al. themselves, in their seminal paper, already considered the
possibility of conflict at representational levels other than the
response level. In fact, they state that conflict in general occurs
due to the “simultaneous activation of incompatible represen-
tations” (Botvinick et al., 2001, p. 68). In any case, empirical
evidence so far suggests that the aversive character of conflicts
does not necessarily depend on response execution.
AFFECTIVE MODULATION OF SEQUENTIAL CONFLICT
ADAPTATION
Another, closely related line of research deals with the effect
of affect on conflict-triggered processing adjustments. The first
group to directly address this issue was van Steenbergen et al.
(2009). They administered an arrow flanker task and arbitrar-
ily presented gain or loss cues after a random subset of trials.
It turned out that gain cues following conflict trials eliminated
the typical conflict adaptation effect and altered early visual dis-
tracter processing (see also van Steenbergen et al., 2012). This was
taken as evidence that these cues counteracted the assumed neg-
ative valence of conflicts (see Dreisbach and Fischer, 2012; Fritz
and Dreisbach, in press) as a consequence of which the conflict
adaptation was abolished. These results fit well with a recent study
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Table 1 | Overview of the reviewed studies.
Paradigm Manipulation (affect/reward) Results
AFFECTIVE VALUE OF CONFLICTS
Brouillet et al. (2011) Affective priming task Action-compatible/incompatible trials served as
primes prior to the evaluation of target valence
Action-compatible/incompatible trials
facilitated the evaluation of
positive/negative targets
Dreisbach and Fischer (2012) Affective priming task Stroop-trials served as primes prior to the
affective evaluation of affective targets
Incongruent/congruent primes
facilitated the evaluation of
negative/positive targets
Fritz and Dreisbach (in press) Affective priming task Stroop-trials served as primes prior to the
affective evaluation of neutral targets
Incongruent/congruent primes
increased negative/positive
judgments of neutral targets
Kool et al. (2010) Demand selection task Decks of cards with either high vs. low
probability of a task switch served as
manipulation of cognitive demand
Anticipated cognitive demand
resulted in avoidance behavior
(cards from the high demand pile are
chosen less frequently)
Schacht et al. (2010) Simon task Simon conflict as trigger signal for physiological
responses
Simon conflict elicited an EEG
conflict signal (N2), but no effects in
peripheral measures
Schouppe et al. (2012) Stroop task Approach/avoidance responses toward/away
from congruent and incongruent Stroop stimuli
Reduced stimulus conflict in the
avoidance condition
AFFECTIVE MODULATION OF CONFLICT ADAPTATION
Dreisbach and Fischer (2011) Fluency task Number words written in easy and hard to read




without any response conflict
Padmala et al. (2011) Face Stroop Phasic affect induction (presentation of neutral
vs. highly negative pictures with high arousal
levels between trials)
Eliminated conflict adaptation for
negative pictures (increased
interference after conflict trials)
van Steenbergen et al. (2010) Flanker task Sustained mood-induction with controlled
valence-arousal dimensions
Stronger conflict adaptation after the
induction of sad and anxious mood
states (irrespective of arousal)
MODULATION OF CONFLICT ADAPTATION BY PERFORMANCE NON-CONTINGENT REWARD
Stürmer et al. (2011) Simon task Random presentation of reward and loss cues
(Experiment 1)
No effect of random reward and loss
cues on conflict adaptation
(Experiment 1)
van Steenbergen et al. (2009) Flanker task Monetary gain or loss cues as arbitrary reward
feedback presented after flanker trials
Gain cues after conflict eliminated
conflict adaptation
van Steenbergen et al. (2012) Flanker task Monetary gain or loss cues as arbitrary reward
feedback presented after flanker trials
Gain cues after conflict eliminated
conflict adaptation, conflict related
theta oscillations sustained longer
after loss
MODULATION OF CONFLICT ADAPTATION BY PERFORMANCE CONTINGENT REWARD
Braem et al. (2012) Flanker task/Task
switching
Performance-dependent reward cues (for fast
and correct responses) were presented in 25%
of flanker trials (Experiment 1). Switching
between Simon and Flanker task (Experiment 2)
Increased conflict adaptation
following reward cues (Experiment 1).
Reward increased switch costs
following conflict trials (Experiment 2)
Stürmer et al. (2011) Simon task Performance-dependent reward (for 25%
fastest responses) and loss cues (25% slowest
responses) (Experiment 2)
Increased conflict adaptation
following reward cues (Experiment 2)
from our laboratories (Dreisbach and Fischer, 2011) where we
manipulated the fluency of processing of target words by using
either easy or hard to read font. Since there is ample evidence
that the experienced ease of processing serves as an affective sig-
nal (see Winkielman et al., 2003 for a review), this manipulation
made it possible to look into sequential processing adjustments,
triggered by aversive (i.e., non-fluent) stimuli even in the absence
of any response conflict. Participants had to judge the magni-
tude of number words that were either written in an easy (fluent)
or hard (non-fluent) to read font. Indeed, a significant adapta-
tion effect was found: the fluency effect (non-fluent minus fluent)
was smaller after non-fluent than after fluent trials, suggesting
that the aversive valence of non-fluent stimuli indeed triggered
processing adjustments in terms of increased effort even without
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any response conflict involved. Finally, in a further study by van
Steenbergen et al. (2010), the authors orthogonally manipulated
mood and arousal between participants and found a significant
interaction of mood and conflict adaptation in the Flanker task:
more specially, subjects experiencing calm (positive, low arousal)
and happy mood (positive, high arousal) showed a reduced con-
flict adaptation effect and subjects in a sad (negative, low arousal)
and anxious mood (negative, high arousal) showed enhanced
conflict adaption, respectively. Arousal, thus, did not have any
effects.
So far, results seem to suggest that negative mood (van
Steenbergen et al., 2010) or negative stimuli (Dreisbach and
Fischer, 2011) promote sequential processing adjustments while
positive mood and unconditional reward eliminate conflict adap-
tation (van Steenbergen et al., 2009, 2010, 2012). However, there
is one study that does not fit into the picture. Padmala et al. (2011)
presented neutral or highly negative pictures with high arousal
levels between picture-word Stroop trials and found reduced con-
flict adaptation following highly arousing negative pictures. This
result obviously stands in sharp contrast to the stronger conflict
adaptation effect found by van Steenbergen et al. under sustained
negative affect. It remains a question of future research, whether
this discrepancy is due to the differential affect manipulations
(e.g., Shackman et al., 2006, 2011a) or due to different arousal
levels between studies.
MODULATION OF CONFLICT ADAPTATION BY REWARD
In contrast to arbitrary reward contingencies of the van
Steenbergen studies, reward conditional on actual task perfor-
mance, which on first glance might be closely related to pos-
itive affect, appears to have the opposite effects on sequential
conflict adaptation. Braem et al. (2012), presented reward cues
for fast and correct responses in a flanker task2 and hypothe-
sized that conditional reward should enhance active connections
between stimulus and response, as a consequence of which,
conflict adaptation should be amplified. This prediction was
derived from the associate learning account of conflict adapta-
tion (Verguts and Notebaert, 2008, 2009; see also Thorndike,
1927). In their theory, and in line with Botvinick’s theory, the
authors also assume that the ACC detects conflict over the out-
put layer. However, instead of directly sending signals to the
DLPFC, the ACC projects to the locus coeruleus which then sends
a Hebbian learning signal presumably via increases in noradren-
ergic activity over the cortex as a consequence of which con-
nections between currently active representations within DLPFC
are strengthened. More generally spoken, it is suggested that
conflict triggers an autonomic arousal response that strength-
ens currently active task representations in working memory. By
this, the model is able to produce not only the typical sequen-
tial conflict adaptation data pattern in terms of reduced response
2In fact, the authors ran a second experiment using the task switching
paradigm. For task switching, the associative learning account (ALA) makes
the opposite prediction, namely that reward increases switch cost following
conflict trials because on task switches following a reward signal, the formerly
relevant task and its corresponding connections become strengthened as a
result of the reinforcement signal. The results were as predicted by ALA.
interference on trials following conflict trials, but also the typi-
cally observed increased conflict induced switch costs, an effect
that the original conflict model would not necessarily predict
(Braem et al., 2012, Experiment 2). Importantly, for the present
purpose, the associative-learning model predicts that positive sig-
nals should serve as a reinforcement signal thereby strengthening
connections between currently active task representations and
thus rather amplify conflict-triggered processing adjustments.
Results were in line with the authors’ hypotheses: conflict adap-
tation was enhanced following reward cues. Interestingly, within
such a reward context, on trials without reward cues no conflict
adaptation was observed. Unfortunately, no punishment condi-
tion was included which makes it hard to decide which of the
two data patterns, the absence of conflict adaptation following
no reward in a reward context or the presence of conflict adap-
tation following reward cues, drives the effect. Support for the
authors’ interpretation in terms of reinforcement learning2 comes
from the fact that the effect was further modulated by the sen-
sitivity toward reward (reward responsiveness). Obviously, the
results of Braem et al. (2012) thus stand in sharp contrast to
the van Steenbergen et al. (2009, 2012) studies reported above.
The only difference between both is that the gain cue in van
Steenbergen’s studies (2009, 2012) was entirely random and not
contingent on behavior whereas in the Braem study, partici-
pants were informed that on a predetermined number of trials,
reward could be earned for fast and correct responding. This
might have rendered the gain cue in the van Steenbergen study
a simple positive affect cue that counteracted the aversive nature
of the preceding conflict, whereas the reward cue in Braem’s
study informed about the successful completion of the preceding
response. Fortunately, there is one study that directly investigated
the effects of random versus performance contingent gains and
losses on conflict adaptation. Stürmer et al. (2011) presented
gains and losses randomly and non-contingent on the respec-
tive performance in one experiment and compared the effects to
a second experiment, where only the 25% fastest and the 25%
slowest responses were rewarded and punished, respectively. It
turned out that random gains and losses had no effect on con-
flict adaptation (Experiment 1). In contrast, gains contingent on
fast and correct responses enhanced conflict adaptation effects
(Experiment 2). The results of the Stürmer et al.’s study (2011) are
thus in line with Braem et al. (2012) and support the assumption
that reinforcement that is contingent on actual task performance
strengthens active connections between task representations and
the response. Random gains irrespective of task performance,
on the other side, seem to have either no effect (Stürmer et al.,
2011) or even eliminate conflict adaptation (van Steenbergen
et al., 2009). This assumption might also explain other seem-
ingly contradictory results from two studies in a related field using
the AX continuous performance task, a paradigm well-suited to
study processes of goal maintenance. Whereas positive affective
pictures (non-contingent on performance) reduced goal mainte-
nance (Dreisbach, 2006), in the same paradigm, reward improved
goal maintenance (Locke and Braver, 2008).
Given the findings of eliminated conflict adaptation under
positive affect and unconditional reward (van Steenbergen et al.,
2009, 2010, 2012) one might therefore speculate that random
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gains also produce a positive affective reaction that, however,
is different from the affective reaction due to successful task
performance. One possible reason could be that performance
contingent reward increases the intrinsic reinforcement signal in
response to correct responses (Satterthwaite et al., 2012). Such
intrinsic reinforcement signals are elicited within the ventral
striatum, a key region of dopamine function, are stronger for
correct than incorrect responses and are further modulated by
task difficulty (Satterthwaite et al., 2012). From this perspec-
tive, successful conflict resolution itself might trigger an intrinsic
reinforcement signal (cf. Braem et al., 2012) which might fur-
ther be enhanced by external performance contingent reward.
Non-contingent random reward, on the other side, might actu-
ally counteract the intrinsic reward signal, as it presumably
conveys the information that task performance is not a value
by itself.
CONCLUSION
In this short review, we first presented evidence from different
studies showing that conflict signals are registered as aversive.
Second, while most studies seem to suggest that positive affect as
subjective experience reduces conflict-triggered processing adjust-
ments, reward as motivational manipulation, on the other hand,
appears to strengthen conflict-triggered processing adjustments.
Based on the present literature we suggest that unconditional
reward reduces the intrinsic reward signal whereas positive mood
reduces the negative experience of the conflict signal—both
resulting in reduced conflict adaptation. Reward contingent on
task performance, by contrast, may serve as reinforcement signal,
enhancing bindings between currently active task representations
and response—thereby increasing conflict adaptation. We thus
close this review by emphasizing the importance to empirically
and theoretically disentangle effects of affect and reward on pro-
cesses of cognitive control in general and on conflict adaption in
particular (see also Chiew and Braver, 2011).
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